Proposed Multilateral Treaty

International Convention on the Public Ownership, Regulation, and Peaceful Governance of Arms Manufacturing

A proposed framework to remove private financial incentives for armed conflict, establish public accountability over weapons manufacturing, protect workers and communities, and advance peaceful industrial conversion.

Preamble

The States Parties to this Convention,

  • Recognizing the inherent dignity and equal value of every human life;
  • Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations of States under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and applicable international arms-control and disarmament agreements;
  • Recognizing the legitimate right of States to provide for their national defense consistent with international law;
  • Deeply concerned that financial incentives associated with armed conflict may create institutional, political, or commercial pressures inconsistent with the peaceful resolution of disputes;
  • Recognizing that corporations, investors, intermediaries, consultants, financial institutions, government officials, and other private interests must never possess a financial incentive to prolong armed conflict or increase human suffering;
  • Determined to ensure that the manufacture and supply of weapons serve legitimate public-security requirements rather than private incentives for unnecessary conflict;
  • Recognizing the legitimate interests of workers, pension beneficiaries, communities, researchers, engineers, and suppliers whose livelihoods may currently depend upon defense industries;
  • Determined that industrial transition shall protect workers and communities while strengthening peaceful manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, aerospace, transportation, medical technology, disaster response, and other socially beneficial industries.

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Purpose

The purposes of this Convention are to: remove or substantially limit private financial incentives associated with the continuation or expansion of armed conflict; establish public accountability over the manufacture and international transfer of major weapons systems; permit and encourage public ownership of strategically significant arms-manufacturing capacity where States Parties determine such ownership necessary; establish rigorous regulation where private ownership continues; prevent corruption, undisclosed conflicts of interest, excessive wartime profits, and improper political influence; protect legitimate national-defense requirements while advancing international peace and security; and promote the peaceful conversion of industrial capacity when military production is no longer necessary.

Article 2

Definitions

"Arms manufacturer" means an entity substantially engaged in designing, developing, manufacturing, integrating, maintaining, or supplying weapons, ammunition, military platforms, or designated weapons components. "Major weapons system" includes combat aircraft, missiles, military drones, armored fighting vehicles, artillery systems, warships, submarines, military weapons, ammunition, and other categories designated by the Conference of States Parties. "Beneficial owner" means the natural person who ultimately owns, controls, or receives substantial economic benefit from an entity. "Conflict-related extraordinary profit" means profit materially exceeding an independently established peacetime benchmark and attributable to an armed conflict or emergency military procurement. "Public ownership" includes ownership by a national government or other legally constituted public entity subject to independent oversight.

Article 3

Fundamental Principle

Weapons necessary for legitimate defense shall be treated as instruments of public security and not principally as instruments for speculative private enrichment. No State Party shall structure its arms-production system in a manner that knowingly creates substantial private economic incentives for the unnecessary initiation, continuation, or escalation of armed conflict.

Article 4

National Public-Interest Control

Each State Party shall establish a legal framework governing strategically significant arms manufacturers within its jurisdiction. A State Party may, consistent with its constitution, domestic law, treaty obligations, and applicable requirements concerning compensation and due process: acquire controlling ownership of strategically significant arms manufacturers; establish public corporations responsible for major weapons production; acquire designated facilities or production capacity required for national security; require public-interest or governmental voting rights concerning designated strategic decisions; or maintain private ownership subject to the stringent regulatory regime established by this Convention. Nothing in this Convention shall itself transfer title to privately owned property.

Article 5

Regulation Where Private Ownership Continues

Where an arms manufacturer remains privately owned, States Parties shall establish effective controls addressing: excessive conflict-related profits; executive compensation tied primarily to wartime sales growth; undisclosed beneficial ownership; political contributions and lobbying connected to procurement decisions; conflicts of interest involving government officials; improper commissions, kickbacks, or intermediary payments; procurement manipulation and noncompetitive emergency contracting; and material transactions involving sanctioned or prohibited recipients.

Article 6

Conflict Profiteering

States Parties shall establish mechanisms capable of identifying conflict-related extraordinary profits. Such mechanisms may include excess-profit taxation; mandatory reinvestment; price controls for designated emergency procurements; recovery of improperly obtained profits; civil or criminal penalties for fraud or corruption; and contributions to internationally supervised humanitarian or reconstruction funds where authorized by national law. Ordinary compensation for legitimate labor, investment, research, manufacturing, and technological development shall not by itself constitute conflict profiteering.

Article 7

Transparency of Ownership

Each State Party shall maintain or participate in a secure and independently auditable registry identifying the beneficial ownership and controlling financial interests of strategically significant arms manufacturers under its jurisdiction. The registry shall enable competent authorities to identify significant ownership concentration, conflicts of interest, sanctions risks, and financial relationships capable of improperly influencing decisions concerning war or peace. Appropriate portions of such information shall be publicly accessible, subject to narrowly tailored national-security and personal-security protections.

Article 8

Government Ethics and the Revolving Door

States Parties shall establish enforceable restrictions concerning movement between senior government positions responsible for defense procurement or military policy and entities materially benefiting from those decisions. Such measures shall include appropriate cooling-off periods, disclosure obligations, conflict-of-interest requirements, and penalties for violations.

Article 9

Procurement Transparency

States Parties shall require meaningful disclosure of major defense procurement expenditures while protecting narrowly defined operational information whose disclosure would create a legitimate national-security risk. Emergency procurement shall remain subject to retrospective independent audit. Classified status shall not be used principally to conceal fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, or unlawful conduct.

Article 10

Worker and Community Protection

No implementation of this Convention should unnecessarily destroy the livelihoods of workers or communities dependent upon defense manufacturing. States Parties undertaking industrial restructuring shall establish transition programs that may include wage and pension protection, retraining and education, employment placement, community redevelopment, conversion of facilities to peaceful manufacturing, and support for small and medium-sized suppliers affected by conversion. Engineers, machinists, scientists, technicians, logistics specialists, construction workers, and other skilled personnel shall be regarded as valuable national resources whose knowledge can contribute to peaceful development.

Article 11

Peaceful Industrial Conversion

States Parties are encouraged to establish programs converting excess defense-production capacity toward civilian and humanitarian purposes, including transportation and infrastructure; renewable and resilient energy systems; medical equipment; aerospace and scientific exploration; emergency and disaster-response equipment; housing and construction technologies; environmental restoration; and other socially beneficial advanced manufacturing.

Article 12

Research and Development

Nothing in this Convention shall prohibit legitimate research necessary for national defense. States Parties shall nevertheless encourage dual-use scientific discoveries originating in publicly funded defense research to be made available for peaceful civilian applications when doing so does not create an unacceptable security risk.

Article 13

International Arms Transfers

States Parties shall maintain effective authorization systems for international transfers of weapons and designated military technology. Transfers prohibited under international law shall not be authorized. States Parties shall strengthen end-use monitoring and take reasonable measures to prevent diversion to unauthorized recipients.

Article 14

International Authority

An International Arms Manufacturing Transparency and Accountability Authority ("the Authority") shall be established by the States Parties. The Authority shall: receive national implementation reports; develop common transparency standards; review aggregate information concerning ownership and procurement; facilitate independent audits where authorized; identify systemic corruption and conflict-of-interest risks; support industrial-conversion programs; provide technical assistance to developing States; and publish an annual Global Arms Manufacturing Transparency Report. The Authority shall possess no independent power to nationalize property or command the armed forces of any State.

Article 15

Independent Inspector General

The Conference of States Parties shall establish an independent Inspector General empowered to investigate credible allegations concerning corruption, manipulation of reporting, undisclosed financial interests, or misuse of the institutions established under this Convention. Whistleblowers providing information in good faith shall receive appropriate legal protections.

Article 16

Emergency Review During Armed Conflict

When a State Party becomes substantially involved in an international armed conflict, extraordinary defense procurement undertaken during that conflict shall become subject to enhanced financial transparency and independent review. Such review shall examine whether prices were reasonable; procurement decisions reflected legitimate military requirements; officials possessed undisclosed financial conflicts; extraordinary profits were generated; and procurement arrangements created inappropriate incentives for prolongation or escalation. Operational military decisions shall remain the responsibility of lawful civilian and military authorities.

Article 17

Reconstruction and Peace Dividend

States Parties may direct revenues obtained through conflict-related excess-profit measures toward civilian reconstruction; rehabilitation of wounded civilians and military personnel; refugee and displaced-person assistance; demining and unexploded-ordnance removal; restoration of hospitals, schools, housing, utilities, cultural property, and infrastructure; veteran reintegration and trauma-recovery programs; and international peacebuilding.

Article 18

Prohibition on Retaliation

No worker, journalist, auditor, civil servant, military member, contractor, shareholder, or other person shall be unlawfully retaliated against for reporting credible evidence of corruption, fraud, unlawful weapons transfers, procurement manipulation, or concealed conflicts of interest through appropriate channels.

Article 19

Sovereignty and Legitimate Defense

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as abolishing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by international law. Nothing herein authorizes one State to seize companies, facilities, or assets located within another State's jurisdiction without lawful authority. Implementation of public ownership shall occur through the constitutional and legal processes of the State exercising jurisdiction.

Article 20

Dispute Resolution

Disputes concerning interpretation or application of this Convention shall first be addressed through consultation and negotiation. States Parties may subsequently agree to mediation, arbitration, adjudication, or another peaceful dispute-resolution mechanism.

Article 21

Relationship to Existing International Law

Nothing in this Convention shall diminish obligations arising under the United Nations Charter, international humanitarian law, applicable arms-control agreements, sanctions regimes, or other binding international obligations. Where this Convention establishes a higher standard of transparency or accountability compatible with those obligations, States Parties are encouraged to apply that higher standard.

Article 22

Conference of States Parties

The States Parties shall meet annually to review implementation, emerging weapons technologies, industrial concentration, financial transparency, compliance, and opportunities for further disarmament and peaceful industrial conversion. Civil society, labor organizations, veterans, humanitarian organizations, industry representatives, survivors of armed conflict, and independent experts may be invited to participate as observers under rules adopted by the Conference.

Article 23

Entry Into Force

This Convention shall enter into force ninety days after deposit of the specified number of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.

Article 24

Amendments

Any State Party may propose amendments. Amendments shall be considered by the Conference of States Parties according to procedures adopted under this Convention.

Article 25

Withdrawal

A State Party may withdraw by written notification to the Depositary. Withdrawal shall take effect twelve months following receipt of notification and shall not extinguish obligations arising from conduct occurring while the Convention remained in force.

Article 26

Signature and Ratification

This Convention shall be open for signature by all States. It shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval according to each State's constitutional processes.

Final Declaration

A Durable International Principle

The security of nations and the economic security of their people need not be opposing objectives.

The States Parties declare that legitimate defense requirements can coexist with democratic accountability, industrial innovation, worker prosperity, transparency, and the peaceful resolution of international disputes.

Human suffering shall not become a business model.

The manufacture of weapons carries an exceptional public responsibility because decisions concerning their production and use may determine whether human beings live or die.

The purpose of this Convention is therefore not to abandon legitimate defense, but to establish a durable international principle: No individual, corporation, investor, government official, or other private interest should possess an unchecked financial incentive to perpetuate war.